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Introduction
Airborne pollutants impact upon a variety of receptors including humans, animals, plants, buildings and materials, etc. Individual's who are aware of and concerned by such impacts they may hold values for reducing airborne pollutants. This paper presents the findings of an experiment designed to investigate the nature of expressed preferences for reducing air pollution impacts. Specifically we apply the contingent valuation (CV) method to the elicitation of individuals' values for reducing these impacts. The method is applied through an experimental design allowing the estimation of values for two separate schemes to reduce specific impacts and a further programme embracing both of these schemes. By varying participants' prior knowledge of what is to be valued such a design permits inspection of the effect upon expressed values of individuals being presented with single or multiple schemes and the interplay between the two. A further particular question addressed by this study is whether values for a number of schemes can be simply added together to provide acceptable estimates of the value of the combined scheme. To the extent that schemes are perceived as partial substitutes for each other, such simple addition will tend to overestimate the value of the combined scheme.
The CV method is a technique for assigning monetary values to individual preferences for changes in the provision of some good or set of goods (for a review of the CV method see Mitchell and Carson, 1989 , and for recent debate see Bateman and Willis, 1999) . The method typically operates through surveys of individuals in which respondents are presented with a hypothetical or contingent market for a good and asked to state either their willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA) compensation for either a gain or loss of that good 1 . CV has been extensively used to assess preferences for non-market goods such as those provided by the environment. Indeed it is the most widely applied of a developing set of stated preference (SP) valuation methods (for an introductory overview of SP and other valuation techniques see Bateman, 1999;  for extended discussion see EFTEC, 2001) .
A key objective of our research was to examine the extent to which values derived by CV were consistent with economic theory or exhibited certain anomalies reported in the literature. By anomalies we mean results that appear to be inconsistent with the expectations of economic theory as set out in many 2 standard texts (see, for example, Varian, 1992) . A number of arguments have been put forward to explain apparent anomalies in values derived by CV:
• Anomalies may be the consequence of methodological failings in the design or application of the CV method (Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Carson, 1997 );
• Stated responses may not relate wholly to the good described by the investigator but in part to some general moral satisfaction derived from stating the intention of giving to a perceived good cause (Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992; Hausman, 1993; Desvousges et al., 1996) ;
• Anomalies may evidence inadequacy in standard economic theory insofar as the theory is normative or prescriptive rather than descriptive of actual human behaviour (Bateman et al., 1997a; 1997b) .
The financial confines of the present research precluded investigation of the origin of any observed anomalies. To do so would have required a switch away from the hypothetical contingent market which underpins the CV method to the use of real-payment approaches such as those used in Bateman et al., (1997a; 1997b) . Given these restrictions, the present paper seeks only to examine whether anomalies are present in CV values, not explain their origin.
Emissions and impacts
In this study we focus principally upon the impacts of air pollutants rather than the emissions themselves. This seems reasonable given that we can expect that an individual's values will be driven by impacts rather than emissions 2 . In order to motivate the empirical study two hypothetical schemes for reducing air pollution impacts were derived as follows:
• Scheme H: Reduction of the impacts of toxic vehicle emissions upon human health
• Scheme P: Reduction of the impacts of acidic power station emissions upon plant life
Further details of these schemes are given subsequently. In order to implement our research design these were supplemented by a further combined scheme as follows:
• Scheme A = Scheme H + Scheme P 2 Arguably individuals may hold values for reducing emissions which have no discernible impact (e.g. colourless, odourless gasses which have no effect upon any receptor) if they object to the fact that these are non-natural. Work being conducted at CSERGE under the CEC EMERGE programme in part looks at one aspect of this issue.
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The goods described by these three schemes provided the basic building blocks for constructing valuation scenarios. In Section 2 we briefly review theoretical expectations regarding CV values for public goods such as these. Specifically we consider four inter-related issues which have been the focus of recent research concerning arguably anomalous results derived from CV studies. These issues are:
(i) Scope sensitivity;
(ii) Part-whole / substitution effects;
(iii) Ordering effect;
(iv) Visible choice set effects.
In Section 3 we describe our experimental design for testing for the presence of such effects in values for the three impact reduction schemes mentioned above (full questionnaires for all design permutations are presented in Appendices to this report). Section 4 presents our experimental results. This opens by providing sampling details and sample socio-economic and demographic characteristics. Valuation results are then presented and a set of hypotheses regarding theoretical expectations (and hence anomalies) are formulated and tested. Finally, Section 5 summarises our findings and presents conclusions.
A note on the interpretation of findings: relative versus absolute values
The objective of the research was purely to investigate the relative nature of values for reducing air pollution impacts within the sample concerned and the hypothetical market employed. Resources were insufficient to investigate the absolute level of those values within either a wider sample or an incentive compatible structure. Given this we do not defend the use of the values elicited in this study outside the context of this research. It cannot be claimed that the values estimated in this study provide a reliable guide to those that individuals might in fact pay for real world impact reduction schemes. A defensible analysis of the absolute values associated with reducing air pollution impacts would require a substantial extension to this research entailing a different approach to the elicitation of values to improve the incentive properties of responses. However, the relationships between CV values for differing schemes can be defended as providing some indication of the expected relationships between actual values for the real-world equivalents of those schemes. It is these relationships between CV values which form the focus of this empirical exercise.
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Theoretical Expectations and Anomalies
The basic tenet of welfare economics is that individuals maximise their utility by choosing what they prefer and preferring what they perceive as yielding maximum utility 3 (Varian, 1992) . The preferences underpinning these choices can be expressed as values which in turn may be assessed through measures such as WTP for a particular good. Economic theory says very little about the psychological processes which form preferences, indeed as Varian (1992) notes, "A utility function is often a very convenient way to describe preferences, but it should not be given any psychological interpretation" (p.95). However, theory does assume a form of rationality and consistency of preferences from which certain testable hypotheses may be derived. In this section we review in turn the four issues identified previously, in each case describing theoretical predictions and how anomalous responses may cause deviations between predicted and observed value relationships.
Scope sensitivity
Scope sensitivity describes the extent to which stated values are sensitive to changes in various dimensions of the good under investigation (Carson et al., 2001) . For example, it may be that values might rise with increases in the physical scale of an impact reduction scheme. However, while standard economic theory suggests that values should not fall as scope increases, it does not require that values have to rise with scope. As a simple example, individuals will only wish to purchase a certain quantity of milk per day after which additional milk has no marginal value. The same is true of some public goods. For instance, an individual may have a positive WTP for setting up a recreational woodland but, once that is provided, be unwilling to pay for a second such woodland.
The issue of whether scope sensitivity should be and is observed in a given application is essentially an open empirical question dependent upon the nature of the good and change in provision concerned. Nevertheless, since publication of the US NOAA Panel report on the validity of CV (Arrow et al., 1993) , scope sensitivity has been viewed (arguably with dubious justification) as a key indicator of study quality and has generated a substantial empirical and theoretical literature (Goodstein, 1995) .
A number of factors may contribute to apparent scope insensitivity in CV values including:
3 This is a positive rather than normative theory in which the individual is the sole arbiter of what they feel maximises their own utility. So, for example, despite the associated health risks, smoking cigarettes can contribute to maximising a particular individual's utility.
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(i) Choosing provision change increments which do not afford the statistical power to detect scope sensitivity (Arrow and Leamer, 1994; Rollins and Lyke, 1998);  (ii) Satiation, where individuals who may value a given increment of a good do not have significant values for subsequent additions of that good (Carson and Mitchell, 1995; Carson et al., 1998) ; (iii) Budget constraints, where individuals are unable to express preferences for a good which has increased in scope because they have insufficient funds 4 ;
(iv) Design and application deficiencies, where poor study design means that respondents either do not understand the intended changes in scope or the valuation scenario lacks credibility;
(iv) Violations of theory (Hausman, 1993) . Bateman et al., (2001) describe a number of tests including examinations of the consistency of scope sensitivity across valuations of nested goods, i.e. where the scope of one 'inclusive' good entirely comprises and exceeds that of another subset good. In the present paper we adopt a straightforward approach to scope sensitivity testing based upon the clear expectations provided by economic theory; specifically that values for an inclusive good should not be less than values for a subset good. Considering the three air pollution impact reduction schemes discussed previously this equates to theoretical expectations given in Equations (1) and (2) that:
and WTP (Scheme P) ≤ WTP (Scheme A)
Satisfaction of these tests is insufficient to prove the theoretical consistency of our contingent values. However, failure of these tests would be a strong indication of anomalous stated preferences.
Part-whole / substitution effects
The 'part-whole 5 phenomena' occurs in the context of CV studies when it appears that the sum of the valuations placed by an individual on the parts of a good is larger than the valuation placed on the good as a whole (i.e. the sum of the part values exceeds that stated for the whole). A formal statement of the relevant standard economic theory is presented in Appendix A. In essence this theory does not allow for part-whole effects.
In the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, part-whole effects emerged as principal focus of debate regarding the validity of the CV method. The argument runs through Kahneman & Knetsch (1992) , Smith (1992) , Harrison (1992) , Carson and Mitchell (1993) , Boyle et al., (1994) , as well as through the interchanges in Hausmann (1993) and between Hanemann (1994) and Diamond and Hausman (1994) . The occurrence of part-whole effects within CV studies was (and still is) seen by critics as a major challenge to the validity of the CV method. However, Bateman et al., (1997a) demonstrate that part-whole effects can be observed in consumers real-money purchases of private goods. This suggests that such effects may constitute a true anomaly and shortcoming of standard theory.
Considering our elicited values and remembering that Scheme A involves the joint implementation of Schemes H and P, then part-whole effects would be observed if Equations (3) holds:
[WTP(Scheme H) + WTP(Scheme P)] > WTP(Scheme A)
For convenience we will refer to the sum [WTP(Scheme H) + WTP(Scheme P)] as the 'calculated' value of Scheme A and contrast this with the amount WTP (Scheme A) which we refer to as the 'stated' value of Scheme A. However, substitution effects mean that the presence of part-whole phenomena for certain goods need not necessarily constitute a theoretical anomaly (Carson et al., 1998) . For example, two 'part' goods might be valued at, say, £10 each when obtained separately. If these 'parts' are regarded as substitutes for each other then the value of a 'whole' bundle consisting of both goods might be less than £20 6 . In our application we have chosen goods which individuals may or may 5 The terms 'part-whole' and 'embedding' are employed in the cognitive psychology literature dealing with the perception of visual parts and wholes, where evidence suggests that one hemisphere of the brain is responsible for perception of wholes, while another deals with the parts of an object (Robertson and Lamb, 1991; Tversky and Hemenway, 1984) . 6 Throughout, our focus is on goods being partial substitutes, and the consequent issue of superadditivity of parts relative to the whole. This reflects the general theoretical demonstration that bundles of public goods tends to be substitute favouring (Carson et al., 1998) and the general finding of superadditivity in contingent valuation experiments 7 not consider as substitutes for each other. It may or may not be that the reduction of air pollution impacts upon plants (Scheme P) is not a substitute, or partial substitute, for relieving air pollution impacts upon human health (Scheme H). Therefore, within the confines of the present research, we cannot distinguish between the part-whole phenomena (a theoretical anomaly) and a substitution effect (a finding which is entirely consistent with theory). However, this project is constrained to an empirical investigation of whether partwhole/substitution effects are observed rather than in disentangling the precise cause of such an effect.
Assuming that individuals see the provision of schemes as independent of each other (an issue we discuss at the end of Section 2), one of two outcomes are possible:
(i) If part-whole/substitution effects are not observed then a valuation obtained from a study of reducing air pollution impacts upon human health can be added to a valuation obtained from a study of reducing air pollution impacts upon plants to obtain an estimate of the value of a scheme to reduce air pollution impacts upon both human health and plants.
Therefore in the absence of part-whole/substitution effects: [WTP(Scheme H) + WTP(Scheme P)] = WTP(Scheme A) i.e. the calculated value for Scheme A equals its stated value.
(ii) If part-whole/substitution effects are observed then adding a valuation obtained from a study of reducing air pollution impacts upon human health to that from a valuation obtained from a study of reducing air pollution impacts upon plants will over-estimate the value of a scheme to both human health and plants.
Therefore in the presence of part-whole/substitution effects: [WTP(Scheme H) + WTP(Scheme P)] > WTP(Scheme A) i.e. the calculated value for Scheme A exceeds its stated value.
Ordering effects, list direction, and list length
One of the earliest findings of empirical CV research is that when respondents are presented with a list of goods and asked to provide values for each of those goods, then the stated value for any given good is dependent upon its position such that the nearer to the start of the list that the good is positioned, the higher is the stated value it is accorded (Randall, Hoehn and Tolley, 1981; Hoehn and (Mitchell and Carson, 1989) . It is, however, theoretically possible that goods are viewed as complements. In such an instance, the sum of the parts would add up to less than the value of the whole.
8 Randall, 1982; Hoehn, 1983; Tolley et al., 1983) . In a recent reassessment of this issue, Bateman et al., (2001) show that whether or not such results are anomalous depends in part upon the type of list in which goods are presented.
In an inclusive list goods are presented as additions to (or subtractions from) any good(s) presented previously in that list. In this manner, adopting the nomenclature of Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) as extended by Carson and Mitchell (1995) , a broader good, A, is thought of as being composed of nested good B plus its complement B*. Similarly B is composed of nested good C and its complement C*. In an inclusive list of goods in which an individual has already expressed a value for good C, a subsequently elicited value for good B will actually refer to C*, the increment between ex ante holdings of good C and ex post holdings of good B. This implies that, since the value stated by a respondent for any given good is dependent upon their current endowment of private and public goods, it is readily seen that, for example, the value for good B as the first good presented to an individual will be different from the value stated when the good appears after good C
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. Such sequencing effects are an expected prediction of economic theory (Carson and Mitchell, 1995; Randall and Hoehn, 1996) . Indeed it is this effect that is purportedly most damaging to the practical application of CV, "because willingness to pay for the same good can vary over a wide range depending on whether the good is assessed on its own or embedded as part of a more inclusive package" (Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992, p.57) . However, a number of authors (e.g., Smith, 1992; Harrison, 1992; Carson and Mitchell, 1995; Carson, Flores and Hanemann, 1998) have sought to show, with varying degrees of mathematical sophistication, that such context dependence is to be expected in inclusive lists.
In an exclusive list, which is the kind of list that choice theory typically addresses, goods are presented as alternatives to any other goods given in that list. This list format also holds the level of other goods constant across valuation tasks. Here the expressed value for a good valued at any position in such a list always refers to the same unit of that good irrespective of its position in that list.
7 While the discussion in the text focuses upon nested goods, Carson, Flores and Hanemann (1998) show that such effects also apply to non-nested private and public goods by the fact that having purchased a good changes the reference level of goods and services in a persons utility function. Because of potential substitution and complementarity effects this may change the value that one places upon other goods. Using a trivial private goods example, think of tea and milk (which are regarded by most English people as being complements!). An individual's value for tea may depend upon whether they have previously been asked to value and purchase milk at their maximum willingness to pay and hence have the same initial utility level but possess more goods and less money. The value that this otherwise identical individual would place upon tea is different than if that person were asked to value tea over and above any nominal income effects associated with the prior purchase of milk. Carson, Flores and Hanemann (1998) show that this analysis also applies to public goods.
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For example, a respondent may initially be asked to value good C, after which the endowment which serves as a reference point for the utility function is returned to its original position (i.e., good C is no longer held) and, say, good B is valued. Here, according to standard theory, the expressed value for good B is independent of its position in the list due to the fact that the same good is being valued (i.e., in this example, the stated value for B does not refer to the value of C* as per the inclusive list case given above) and the reference income, prices, level of private and public goods and utility level across valuation questions remains constant. Provided that the CV respondent adjusts their perceived holdings of goods back to the initial status quo between valuation tasks, any residual variation associated with presentation is therefore an anomaly (possibly of cognitive psychological origin) and can be termed an ordering effect. Empirical evidence of the presence of such effects in CV studies is mixed (Boyle, Welsh and Bishop, 1993) .
Again assuming that individuals see the provision of schemes as independent of each other (see discussion at the end of Section 2), ordering effects would be observed if the value of goods presented in an exclusive list varied according to their position in that list. We can further characterise lists in terms of their 'direction', i.e. whether they progress from 'smaller' to 'larger' goods, which we term a 'bottom-up' list, or from 'larger' to 'smaller' to yield a 'top-down' list. The terms 'small' and 'large' are, strictly speaking, subjectively determined by the individual. However, typically for nested goods list direction can be determined through inspection of how goods are nested. In our experiment we have clear nesting of Schemes H and P within Scheme A. However, the relationship of Schemes H and P to each other are not, a-priori, obvious (although an anthropocentric world view might suggest that relieving impacts upon humans is more valuable than relieving impacts upon plants). Therefore, without strong priors regarding expected values list direction is only obvious ex-post for nonnested goods. Nevertheless we shall make use of this list direction terminology in discussing our results.
A final permutation concerning list definition concerns the length of lists. Given the three schemes we have defined previously, list length can be varied by presenting different sub-samples of respondents with either one, two or all three of the schemes concerned. Evidence exists that varying raising awareness of the constituent parts of a good may increase stated values for that good; a phenomena known as event-splitting (Starmer and Sugden, 1993; Humphrey, 1995; 1996) . In our experiment we vary list length between two or three goods, always including Schemes H and A and either including or excluding scheme P. By always presenting Scheme A (which embraces Schemes H and P) as the final valuation object we attempt to see whether prior inclusion of Scheme P results in an eventsplitting effect, raising the value of Scheme A.
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As conjectured in Bateman et al., (2001) , list length may also have an effect on stated values if warm glow (individual value associated with the act of giving rather than the value of the good (Andreoni, 1990) or other-regarding behaviour (Ferraro et al., 2002) is somehow partitioned across all the valuation tasks that an individual understands that they will be asked to complete. These authors state "Another conjecture…is that warm glow may somehow be allocated across the extent of the initial visible choice set. Here the entire good causes account is allocated across the initial valuation response in stepwise disclosure designs but is spread across the wider set of goods available from the outset in advanced disclosure formats." (footnote 12, p. 25). Bateman et al., (2001) define a new dimension through which CV study design may influence scope sensitivity; the visible choice set. Reflecting recent theoretical developments by Cubitt and Sugden (forthcoming), they define the visible choice set as that set of goods which, at any given point in a valuation exercise, the respondent perceives as being the full extent of purchase options which will be made available in the course of that exercise. The important point to note here is that in some study designs the extent of the visible choice set is varied throughout the course of the experiment. This may occur in bottom-up, top-down, inclusive and/or exclusive list study designs. For example, in a bottom-up, exclusive list, prior to any values being elicited respondents might be told that they are going to be presented with three goods, C, B and A and asked to value each in turn; an approach which Bateman et al., (2001) term an advance disclosure visible choice set. A similar framework could be adopted for top-down designs. Conversely, under what is in all other respects the same design, respondents may be presented initially with only good C and a value elicited on the basis of that visible choice set alone; then they are told about good B (i.e., the visible choice set changes relative to that held at the initial valuation) and a further valuation elicited; finally they are presented with good A (i.e., the visible choice set is further changed) and a value elicited. Similarly, but perhaps less dramatically, a top-down approach could be perceived as altering the realm of the possible choice set by unfolding new opportunities for valuing subsets of the more inclusive goods. Bateman et al., (2001) characterise such approaches as exhibiting a stepwise disclosure visible choice set, with valuation tasks being interspersed between each expansion of the choice set. This contrasts with such valuation tasks being undertaken after full revelation of the full choice set as per the advance disclosure approach. Note that in the stepwise approach each valuation task is undertaken in ignorance of the 11 subsequent expansion of the choice set. As such the additional choices can be seen as unanticipated 'surprises' to the respondent 8 .
Visible choice set effects
Considering our elicited values, visible choice set effects would be observed if values for the same good differed according to whether they were obtained from stepwise and advance disclosure treatments. So, for example, if WTP (Scheme P) obtained from a stepwise disclosure treatment differed from WTP (Scheme P) obtained from an advance disclosure treatment then we observe visible choice set induced effects.
Evidence for the occurrence of such effects is presented in Bateman et al., (2001) who analyse visible choice set and list direction effects within a nested set of improvements to an open-access lake in Norfolk, UK. Here three schemes were presented in an exclusive list format. A split sample design was used to present goods within both advance and stepwise disclosure visible choice sets. These samples were further subdivided into bottom-up and top-down list direction subsamples (which, due to the nested characteristics of goods, could be determined ex-ante; e.g. a bottom-up list direction presents the scheme with the smallest impact first and that with the largest impact last). The resulting four subsamples were denoted as follows: ABU = Advance disclosure of choice set; bottom-up list direction ATD = Advance disclosure of choice set; top-down list direction SBU = Stepwise disclosure of choice set; bottom-up list direction STD = Stepwise disclosure of choice set; top-down list direction 8 At issue is the degree to which changes in the visible choice set are unanticipated. We posit that in most scope and list tests conducted to date, individuals have substantially uninformed priors concerning potential subsequent expansions in the visible choice set prior to any given valuation task. We suggest that this lack of prescience stems from at least two sources. First, as raised by Bishop and Welsh (1992) in the context of the valuation of little known but endangered species, information gathering is costly, and one way to ration scarce information gathering resources is to ignore information that is not relevant to the current choice set. Since contingent valuation exercises typically address a novel issue it is naïve to expect respondents to anticipate the realm of possible alternative scenarios that could potentially be offered. Second, the choices and the lists to be presented are controlled exclusively by the interviewer, who is, by the nature of the exchange, endowed with the "ability to construct arbitrary sequences of trading opportunities, to condition these opportunities on events and to spring unforeseen opportunities on their potential victims" (Cubitt and Sugden, draft manuscript p.5). These factors lead us to believe that it is not unreasonable to assume that in most stepwise progressions respondents do not anticipate subsequent valuation questions once the initial valuation task has been completed. Unfortunately, the existing literature does not provide enough information to allow us to test this formally, although evidence to support this contention is provided in Bateman et al., (2001) . Source: Bateman et al., (2001) .
The results detailed in Table 1 show a clear message. Within each treatment increases in the scope of goods are synonymous with rises in WTP, a result which is in accordance with theoretical expectations (although theory merely states that values should not decline with increasing scope). However, while treatments ABU, ATD and STD yield insignificant differences in WTP values, these do differ significantly from those derived from the SBU treatment. It seems that a treatment presenting respondents with the lowest value good first and where they are at that time unaware of a wider choice set, yields higher values both for that initial good and for those presented subsequently. This interaction of visible choice set and ordering effects is explicitly tested for in the experimental design used in the present analysis.
Whether or not such effects constitute theoretical anomalies is a debateable point. For private goods, economic-theoretic expectations are clear with respect to willingness to pay and disclosure type; choice theory states that preferences are independent of the choice set and therefore we should expect no difference in stated values elicited from either a stepwise or advance disclosure presentation of an exclusive (or inclusive) list. Yet, for public goods, choice theory predicts that strategic incentives may affect stated values where the visible choice set contains more than one such good. This may apply even when those goods considered are exclusive, such that only one good will eventually be provided, if the stated values for one good are not considered to be independent of the other goods in the choice set. These strategies may change according to both the number and composition of goods in a choice set. Therefore the strategy space may differ through the course of a stepwise exclusive list while it remains constant within an advance disclosure treatment.
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This does not mean that strategic incentives do not apply to advance disclosure formats, merely that these incentives are constant. Strategic behavior arguments are considered in our subsequent explorations of the empirical results obtained in this research. In the interim, because strategies could be complex and vary across individuals, we will proceed with the assumption that respondents treat the choices offered in the exclusive lists employed to be independent. This allows us to test the hypothesis that willingness to pay responses will be invariant to visible choice set type.
14 3. Study Design 3.1 Scenarios: air pollution impact reduction schemes A study design was defined to examine whether the various anomalies and effects under investigation were present within a CV study focussing upon values for the reduction of air pollution impacts. The various anomalies were assessed through a split sample design with each sample being presented with a somewhat different questionnaire (full details of all questionnaires are presented in Appendix B).
As noted in Section 1.2, the objective of the research was purely to investigate the relative nature of values for reducing air pollution impacts. Resources were insufficient to investigate the absolute level of those values within an incentive compatible structure. Given these constraints we adopted a simple open-ended response format for eliciting WTP answers. It is recognised that the open-ended format is liable to strategic behaviour by respondents (Carson et al., 2000) with under-representation of true WTP being a frequently cited strategy 9 . However, in a split sample context, such as adopted in this study, the open-ended approach is acceptable for detecting differences in WTP responses between treatments (see for example, Bateman and Langford, 1997 ). The open-ended method is also highly statistically efficient in that each respondent is asked to state their maximum WTP which in turn dramatically reduces sample size requirements relative to say the more incentive compatible dichotomous choice approach (Hanemann and Kanninen, 1999) thus facilitating a sufficient sample size within the confines of the available research budget.
Given our focus upon differences in WTP between treatments, rather than a concern for the validity or defensibility of absolute WTP values, efforts were made to simplify the cognitive task faced by respondents. Providing the level of information is kept constant across treatments, any significant difference between samples (other than those due to sample characteristics) may indicate the presence of anomalies. Given this we were able to justify reliance upon respondents' prior levels of information, assuming that this is randomly distributed across samples. This was clarified to respondents in the opening statement of all questionnaires which also introduced the subject of air pollution impacts and read as follows: "This research concerns peoples views about air pollution. We deliberately do not provide you with lots of new information and statistics about the current level or impacts of air pollution as we 9 Although over-statement is an equally plausible strategy (see Bateman et al., forthcoming) .
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want to avoid unduly influencing your answers with information that most people do not have."
Respondents were then appraised of the valuation tasks before them by informing them that they would be presented with details regarding one or more air quality improvement schemes and that they would be asked to value the implementation of these schemes. Respondents facing advance disclosure visible choice sets were told from the outset the number of air quality improvement schemes (two or three) that they would be presented with during the entire course of the experiment. However, respondents facing the stepwise information treatment were only told of the first scheme that they would face. The following statement is taken from an advance information treatment (details of all treatments are given in Appendix B):
"We are going to tell you about three alternative air quality improvement schemes. Once we have told you about all three then we will consider each in turn and ask you what the maximum amount you would be willing to pay per year for each scheme to be implemented in practice. We are not going to go into technical details about how schemes will be implemented or about how money would be collected as there are a variety of possible options and this is not what we are interested in. Do not worry about these technical details, just think about how much you are willing to pay for each scheme.
As each of the three schemes is an alternative to the current situation we start by briefly considering, in very simple terms, what this current situation is."
As can be seen, the above statement also introduced the information regarding the current situation which was phrased as the following simple statement (this and subsequent air quality improvement schemes are presented in approximately the same format as shown to respondents): "Here briefly is the current situation:
Current Situation
• Existing regulations ensure that air pollution stays at roughly its present level with some consequences for human health, water quality, plants and animals, buildings and materials etc.
Respondents were then presented with various combinations of scheme details and valuation tasks. The various combinations employed over the split sample design are detailed in Section 3.2. We detail these as follows. In this section we provide details for all of the schemes (remembering that our event-splitting test meant that some respondents were only presented with certain of these schemes).
Details for Scheme H were as follows:
Scheme H: Toxic vehicle emissions and human health
• The main impact of toxic vehicle emissions is in terms of damage to human health. For example, vehicle emissions are associated with worsening the condition of those suffering from heart and respiratory problems. They may also put children at risk of respiratory problems.
• The toxicity of vehicle emissions may be reduced in a number of ways but all of these cost money. Please consider the maximum amount you would be willing to pay per year to fund a scheme which reduced the toxicity of vehicle emissions to the level where these respiratory and health effects no longer occurred.
For those respondents presented with Scheme P details were as follows:
Scheme P: Acidic power station emissions and effects on plant life
• The main effect of the acidic emissions produced by power stations is upon plant life. For example power plant emissions are associated with acid rain which damages plants.
• Acidic power station emissions may be reduced in a number of ways but all of these cost money. Please consider the maximum amount you would be willing to pay per year to reduce those types of power plant emissions which affect plant life to the level where these effects no longer occurred.
Details for Scheme A were as follows (again taken from an advance disclosure treatment):
17 "We could implement the following alternative which is simply a combination of both of the above alternatives. "
Scheme A: Scheme H and Scheme P • The main impact of toxic vehicle emissions is in terms of damage to human health. For example, vehicle emissions are associated with worsening the condition of those suffering from heart and respiratory problems. They may also put children at risk of respiratory problems.
• Toxic vehicle emissions and acidic power station emissions may be reduced in a number of ways but all of these cost money. Please consider the maximum amount you would be willing to pay per year to reduce those types of emissions to the level where their effects no longer occurred.
In every case (all samples) schemes were presented in exclusive list formats, i.e. as alternatives to each other (consequently ordering effects, to do with the positioning of a scheme within a list, are not expected).
Split sample design and corresponding tests
Investigation of the various anomalies discussed previously dictated the various treatments which together define the study design. Considering these anomalies in turn we can see the various design requirements they impose:
(i) Scope Sensitivity: In this study we only conduct simple scope tests examining whether stated values are non-declining as the scope of a good increases. In terms of study design this is provided by contrasting values for Scheme H or Scheme P with values for Scheme A (which comprises both Schemes H and P). Theoretical expectations are that values for Scheme A should not be lower than those for either Scheme H or Scheme P. Such a test can be afforded by any sample which faces questions valuing Scheme A and at least one of the other Schemes.
(ii) Part-whole/substitution effects: A formal test for part-whole/ substitution effects requires that respondents be asked to provide individual values for Schemes H, P and A and so such samples 18 were collected. If the calculated value for Scheme A (obtained by summing the values stated for Scheme H and those for Scheme P) exceeds stated values for Scheme A then we have evidence of either an anomalous part-whole effect or a theoretically consistent substitution effect.
(iii) Ordering effects: Given that all schemes are presented within exclusive lists as alternatives to each other, then (accepting that strategic incentives may vary between disclosure groups) the value of each scheme should be independent of its position within a list.
To test this in some treatments Scheme H was presented before Scheme P while in others this ordering was reversed. A further event-splitting test is provided by examining the value of Scheme A in lists of either two or three schemes.
(iv) Visible choice set effects: These were examined by presenting some respondents with advance information regarding all the schemes they would be valuing while other treatments presented respondents with stepwise information detailing just one scheme at a time and eliciting values before presenting a subsequent scheme.
Combining all the above tests led us to devise a study design consisting of five subsamples of respondents, described in points (i) to (v) below:
Here a stepwise information approach was adopted. Respondents were presented with Scheme H and asked to value it. Respondents were then presented with Scheme A and asked to value that.
Comparison of these values provides a simple scope test. We will give this sample the label SHA indicating a stepwise (S) information format eliciting values for Schemes H and A.
(ii) Here a stepwise information approach was again adopted. Respondents were presented with Scheme H and asked to value it. This process was then repeated for Scheme P and finally for Scheme A. (v) Here a stepwise information approach was adopted. Respondents were presented with Scheme P and asked to value it. Respondents were then presented with Scheme H and asked to value that. This sample does not yield a meaningful simple scope test as the relative values for these two schemes are subject to individual preferences. However, comparison of these values with those for the same schemes elicited from samples SHPA and SHA provide tests of ordering effects for these values. We label this sample the label SPH indicating a stepwise (S) information format eliciting values for Schemes P and H. Table 2 summarises the split sample design discussed above. The first column identifies each sample using the labels defined above. Numbers in parentheses are sample sizes from our main survey. The second column confirms the disclosure type and the middle column shows the ordering of information provision and valuation tasks for each scheme considered by a sample. Here bold type indicates the choice set visible to participants prior to the initial valuation task, confirming the difference between stepwise and advance disclosure formats. Italic type shows the subsequent expansion of the visible choice set just prior to the second valuation task for participants in stepwise treatments. Finally, normal type indicates the further expansion of the visible choice set experienced by participants in the SHPA treatment just prior to their third and last valuation task. Note that the presence of substitution effects means that the stated and calculated values for the same scheme may not be identical, even within the same sample. Indeed divergence can be taken as suggesting that either partwhole or substitution effects are significant. Information in the 'Design' column is formatted as follows:
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Bold type indicates the initial choice set visible to respondents when they gave their first valuation response. For advance disclosure treatments only this also applies for second and (where applicable) third valuation responses.
Italic type indicates the subsequent choice set visible to stepwise disclosure respondents when they gave their second valuation response. (where applicable).
Normal type (non-bold, non-italic) indicates the subsequent choice set visible to stepwise disclosure respondents when they gave their third valuation response (where applicable).
Results
Data were collected through one-to-one, in-person surveys of students at their residential addresses at the University of East Anglia, addresses being selected at random. A total sample of 238 respondents was collected of which 50 were used in a pilot survey refining the wording of questionnaires. As wording was substantially simplified between the pilot survey and the main survey, those presented with the pilot questionnaire are excluded from our main analysis.
Sub-sample demographic characteristics
All respondents were asked a number of socio-economic and demographic questions. These were used to examine possible differences between subsamples which may complicate our subsequent analyses. Summary statistics for key variables within and across samples are presented in Table 3 .
Considering respondents expected income over the next 12 months, while sample AHPA appears to have a somewhat higher income than other samples these differences proved to be just insignificant at α = 5%. Similarly no significant differences were found either in terms of the number of non-UK respondents in each sample (who arguably would be less likely to receive the long term benefits of any air pollution impact reduction scheme) or with respect to gender. Considering respondent age, while the descriptive statistics shown in Table 3 shows that mean age for all samples was within the range 20 to 24 years, nevertheless significant differences were found here again it is sample AHPA which appears the most different to other samples. Taking into account that this is also the sample with the smallest number of respondents, it seems likely that there are a few older (and probably richer) respondents within this sub-sample. Although these are not substantial differences they are worth keeping in mind when we consider our subsequent valuation results.
WTP for air pollution impact reduction schemes by sub-sample
Descriptive statistics for the various stated and calculated WTP measures obtained from each sub-sample are detailed in Table 4 . Examining these we can see that WTP values for Scheme H (all of which are here shown as stated values only) are relatively stable between sub-samples with mean measures ranging from about £72-£85 and median values being between £50-£70 (notice that the highest values are obtained from sub-sample SPH which is the only one where Scheme H is not presented first).
Stated values for Scheme P are also relatively stable with means ranging from £44-£54 and medians varying from £30-£47 (the latter value again being obtained from sub-sample SPH). However, these values differ substantially . This large excess of stated over calculated values suggest either strong part-whole problems or that Schemes H and P are at least partial substitutes for each other. This latter explanation seems entirely plausible and so we cannot conclude that there is firm evidence of anomalies here and assume that this is the case in the remainder of our discussion.
Stated values for Scheme A are also relatively similar across treatments with means ranging from £100-£113 and medians varying from £70-£100. Calculated values for Scheme A are consistently above their stated equivalents with means from £117-£131 and medians from £90-£120. Again this would be expected if we were either witnessing part-whole phenomena or if Schemes H and P were to some degree substitutes for each other (in this latter case the calculated sum of individuals values for Schemes H and P should exceed their stated joint value as expressed for Scheme A; this pattern conforms to what we find in the results). This latter explanation again seems highly plausible and so we have no reason to assume that these results necessarily constitute theoretical anomalies.
The overall impression given by the results presented in Table 4 is of relatively stable values for each individual scheme, but of substitution effects existing between Schemes H and P resulting in their values as individual goods exceeding their value as the joint good provided by Scheme A.
These results have some important messages for regulatory policy assessment. First, they suggest that values for air pollution impact reduction schemes may be significant (given the lack of incentive compatibility in our open ended elicitation format this can only be a tentative judgement, but the results do suggest that such values may exist). Second, the findings suggest that these values may be reasonably robust (although we investigate this issue further below). Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, these findings suggest that values obtained for individual air pollution impact reduction schemes cannot be simply added across schemes to obtain estimates of the value of wider schemes embracing all of those individual schemes. Our results suggest that such an approach ignores the substitution effects which may exist between schemes and 10 Note that the lower end of the distribution of calculated values for Scheme P includes a number of negative values derived from cases where WTP for Scheme H exceeds that for Scheme A. This is a cause for some concern as such results typically arise where respondents feel that the more embracing good (here Scheme A) lacks credibility or is unlikely to be implemented. Other possible explanations for such responses are considered in Bateman et al., (2001) . 25 therefore risks the likelihood that the value of wider schemes, estimated by such a route, would be over-estimated.
Finally inspection of the distributional information contained in Table 4 suggests that, as often observed in CV studies, distributions of WTP responses are positively skewed. The final column of the table reports a formal test for normality indicating that, in every case apart from one of the calculated measures, normality is rejected at p < 0.1. This indicates that parametric tests relying upon such normality assumptions may be unreliable. Given this we employ non-parametric techniques for testing relationships between the measures collected (a comparison with parametric results is given in Appendix C which shows that the latter are highly susceptible to outlier responses).
Tests of scope sensitivity and value consistency
As discussed previously, a-priori we have no theoretical expectations of the relative values associated with Schemes H and P, either could be valued higher or they could be valued equally. However, given that each is nested with the large good provided by Scheme A we have a clear expectation that WTP for the latter should not be less than that for either of the former.
An illustration of the degree of scope sensitivity observed between Scheme H and A is given in Figure 1 which shows mean stated and calculated WTP values for each good and for each treatment (stated values being used in preference to calculated values where both are available from one treatment). As can be seen the degree of scope sensitivity appears to be similar across treatments. Figure 2 which repeats this analysis for Schemes P and A although here it should be noted that for treatments SHA and AHA values for Scheme P are calculated rather than stated. Nevertheless, the degree of scope sensitivity again seems similar across treatments.
In order to test the significance of these differences and to examine differences between WTP measures for Schemes both within and across treatments a series of non-parametric tests were conducted full details of which are provided in Appendix C. A summary of findings is presented in Table 5 .
The numbers given in the cells of Table 5 indicate the number of tests which show either a significant (sig) or non-significant (ns) difference between the WTP values concerned. Considering comparisons between different value measures (non-shaded cells), here numbers in brackets are within-sample (internal) tests, while numbers outside brackets are between-sample (external) tests. All of the former internal tests hold treatment constant and show consistently significant differences between measures. This confirms that the apparent scope sensitivity indicated in Figures  1 and 2 is indeed statistically significant and that, within any given treatment, values for Scheme H are significant larger than those for Scheme P and significantly smaller than those for Scheme A. This supports the anthropocentric prior that individuals value reduction of air pollution impacts upon human health more than the reduction of impacts upon plants.
The external tests, shown by the figures outside brackets in unshaded cells, are considerably less consistent and indicate that treatment differences across samples do have significant impacts upon WTP values. It is to an analysis of these treatment differences that we now turn. In order to test the overall effect outlined in (i) above the variables TYPE_H, TYPE_P and TYPE_A were defined to characterise the five distinct treatment types employed to elicit values for the three schemes investigated. In summary these variables were coded as follows (specific coding details for each variable are given in Appendix C): The last row of Table 6 gives a formal test of the null hypothesis of the equality of values for given schemes across the levels of the TYPE variable. Equality is clearly rejected for both Scheme H and Scheme P. For Scheme A the test statistic falls just outside the conventional 5% significance level, although it is clearly significant at the 10% level 15 . In order to investigate the determinants of the effects noted in Table 6 a set of potential explanatory variables were defined to parameterise the various dimensions of our study design. These variables are defines as follows: CALC = 1 if the value under investigation was calculated (as defined previously); = 0 if the value was stated directly STEP = 1 if the value under investigation was elicited from a stepwise disclosure choice set; = 0 if it was elicited from an advance disclosure choice set 33 SPH = 1 if the value under investigation was elicited from the design in which Scheme P was presented first (i.e. sample SPH); = 0 if the value was elicited from a design in which Scheme H was presented first.
EVENT_SPLIT = 1 for values of Scheme A elicited from designs where prior stated values for both Scheme H and Scheme P were elicited; = 0 for values of Scheme A elicited from designs where prior stated values for Scheme H only were elicited. ). Our test statistic shows that the part-whole/substitution effect suggested by these findings is clearly significant.
Results for the STEP variable show a reasonably consistent direction, with mean WTP values higher from stepwise than advance disclosure treatments.
However, Examination of medians shows that this effect is not clear-cut and tests only indicate significance at the 10% level for Scheme P and no significance for either of the other schemes. However, returning to the results of Bateman et al., (2001) given in Table 1 we can see that such a finding is not surprising as it was only in the stepwise bottom-up (SBU) treatment that results were clearly different from those of other treatments. As discussed previously, because we were not exclusively dealing with nested goods in the present experiment we could not specify from the outset which of our various stepwise disclosure treatments would most closely conform to the SBU approach. However, we now have clear evidence from previous tables that Scheme P is considered to be the lowest value of the goods presented to participants. Therefore, SBU design used in our previous study corresponds to the SPH treatment used here, with the lowest value good being valued first in a stepwise format where participants are unaware that they will be subsequently be presented with the higher value Scheme H good. Table 7 shows that the impact of adopting the SPH design is to substantially raise the WTP statements for the initially valued good (Scheme P) relative to the comparatively low values accorded to this good under other treatments. Tests confirm the statistical significance of this result. This effect is carried over into the values for Scheme H elicited from treatment SPH which are again significantly higher than those for under other treatments (a result we comment upon further in conclusions to this paper). Unsurprisingly this means that the calculated values for Scheme A from treatment SPH are also significantly higher than those from other samples.
Finally Table 7 also reports results from our test of event splitting effects in values for Scheme A. Here, asking respondents to value both the constituent parts of Scheme A as opposed to only asking for a prior of Scheme H (and not eliciting prior values for Scheme P) results in an increase in mean WTP for Scheme A from £103.38 to £122.19 (with median values increasing from £90 to £100). However, while this directional shift is in accordance with event-splitting expectations, tests show that this effect is not statistically significant in this instance 16 .
Summarising Table 7 we can see that the CALC and SPH effects appear to be the major drivers of within scheme variation in values. However, these variables overlap significantly in that all of the values for Scheme A derived from treatment SPH are calculated rather than stated. To control for a final test was performed which permits us to examine the crucial question of whether values derived from single 'part' good valuation studies can be added to those for other 'parts' to correctly estimate values for embracing 'whole' goods. To test this we examine whether the sum of values for Scheme H and Scheme P, presented as the first good encountered by respondents in designs where they are unaware of any subsequent valuation possibilities, yield a calculated value for A which is similar to that obtained from stated values for Scheme A. 16 We also examined the possibility that the list length seen by respondents in the initial visible choice set may impact upon values for other schemes even after controlling for position within a list. Such tests cannot be performed upon stepwise treatments where initial list length is always constant at just one good. However, some, albeit weak, evidence for a list length effect can be gleaned by examining the stated values for Scheme H obtaining from advance disclosure treatments AHA and AHPA. Here Scheme H is always valued first and the only difference between the treatments is in terms of list length. From Table 4 Table 8 reports findings from comparisons of these measures.
Inspecting Table 8 Our experiments yielded a number of findings. There was considerable value consistency within stated values for each scheme suggesting that respondents were referring to some underlying (although not necessarily theoretically consistent) preferences or valuation process. Furthermore, no anomalies were found regarding sensitivity to the scope of schemes, instead general evidence of significant scope sensitivity was observed.
However, the use of stepwise designs which present participants with low value goods first (i.e. our SPH treatment) appears to generate significantly different values than do other approaches. Specifically, when a good which is valued at a relatively low level in other treatments is presented at the beginning of a stepwise list its value is elevated. This finding could be interpreted as either a theoretically consistent substitution effect (Carson et al., 1998) or as the impact of a theoretically inconsistent 'moral satisfaction of giving' to a good cause being attached to first responses (Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992) . Disentangling the different potential drivers of an identical effect is problematic and would require a considerable 'verbal protocol' extension to our design (Schkade and   39 Payne, 1992). However, the consequent effect upon Scheme H values in the SPH treatment cannot be explained by economic theory which would expect that the movement from first position in all other treatments to second position in the SPH list would result in a reduction in stated values arising from substitution effects. Instead, as shown in Table 7 , values for Scheme H from the SPH treatment are significantly higher than those in other treatments. While this is inconsistent with economic theory it does conform to psychological expectations based on an 'anchoring and adjustment' heuristic wherein the high values stated previously for Scheme P feed through into elevated values for Scheme H stated subsequently.
While the latter finding is of most concern from a theoretical and methodological perspective, perhaps the most important practical finding concerned the clear evidence found of significant part-whole/substitution effects. In particular, we found that summing the values obtained from several single good valuation exercises (i.e. corresponding to first responses in our stepwise disclosure designs) to calculate estimates for wider goods risks the likelihood of significantly overestimating the value of the latter wider goods. Policymakers need to be aware of the potential for such relationships when assessing valuation evidence as part of efforts to design appropriate economic instruments for regulatory purposes.
In summary therefore, our findings raise a number of theoretical and methodological and applications issues which need to be borne in mind when undertaking valuation work regarding air pollution externalities. Indeed we might expect that a number of these concerns may well apply to many public good valuation exercises. However, in conclusion we should remember that this was a relatively simple exercise dictated by resource constraints which precluded the use of incentive compatible designs. Therefore its findings should be treated with caution. In particular the absolute values for WTP measures should be disregarded. Nevertheless the fundamental nature of the concerns raised suggest that these issues are worthy of further investigation within a more controlled and incentive compatible framework. 
Appendix A: Theoretical Model of Part-Whole Effects
Suppose an individual has an endowment of a group of goods, x (so that x is a vector) and spends y on all other goods. Let x', x" represent two other levels of endowment, with x < x' < x", so that (x"-x') and (x'-x) are the `first' and `second' parts respectively. Willingness to pay for the first part is defined by:
where U is a utility function representing the individual's preferences. Willingness to pay for the second part, given that the consumer has the first part is:
U(x,y) = U(x",y-wtp ).
PHB proper exists if the elicited values for wtp i , i=1,2,3, are such that,
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If demand for x is normal, then this leads to an overestimate of wtp 2 which may yield the conclusion that part-whole bias exists when it does not. 
Appendix B: Questionnaires
In this Appendix we reproduce the questionnaires used in each of three samples used in this study (questionnaires have been somewhat reformatted in size to fit this report). Each questionnaires is denoted with the sample to which it appertains using the group number and coding system developed for Table 2 and are presented in the following order: This research concerns peoples views about air pollution. We deliberately do not provide you with lots of new information and statistics about the current level or impacts of air pollution as we want to avoid unduly influencing your answers with information that most people do not have.
We are going to tell you about an air quality improvement scheme. Once we have told you about this scheme we will consider it and ask you the maximum amount you would be willing to pay per year in order to be implemented in practice. We are not going to go into technical details about how this scheme will be implemented or about how money would be collected as there are a variety of possible options and this is not what we are interested in. Do not worry about these technical details, just think about how much you are willing to pay. This scheme is an alternative to the current situation and we start by briefly considering, in very simple terms, what this current situation is.
Please consider a move from the Current Situation described below to that under Scheme H.
Current Situation
Scheme H: Toxic vehicle emissions and human health
Think about how much the implementation of Scheme H is worth to you.
What is the maximum amount you would be prepared to pay per year in order to implement Scheme H such that the air quality is improved from its current level to the level described in Scheme H.
(WRITE YOUR ANSWER IN THE BOXES BELOW)
Maximum amount per year:
In the space below please briefly describe the factors that influenced your answer:
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After this point scheme H NO LONGER OPERATES Consider now a move from the Current Situation to that under Scheme A.
Current Situation
Think about how much the implementation of Scheme A is worth to you.
What is the maximum amount you would be prepared to pay per year in order to implement Scheme A such that the air quality is improved from its current level to the level described in Scheme A.
(WRITE YOUR ANSWER IN THE BOXES BELOW)
In the space below please briefly describe the factors that influenced your answer: This research concerns peoples views about air pollution. We deliberately do not provide you with lots of new information and statistics about the current level or impacts of air pollution as we want to avoid unduly influencing your answers with information that most people do not have.
We are going to tell you about an air quality improvement scheme. Once we have told you about this scheme we will consider it and ask you the maximum amount you would be willing to pay per year in order to be implemented in practice. We are not going to go into technical details about how this scheme will be implemented or about how money would be collected as there are a variety of possible options and this is not what we are interested in. Do not worry about these technical details, just think about how much you are willing to pay.
This scheme is an alternative to the current situation and we start by briefly considering, in very simple terms, what this current situation is.
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Here is briefly the current situation:
Current Situation
And here is the alternative scheme H:
Scheme H: Toxic vehicle emissions and human health
Think about how much the implementation of Scheme H is worth to you.
(WRITE YOUR ANSWER IN THE BOXES BELOW)
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After this point scheme H NO LONGER OPERATES Consider now a move from the Current Situation to that under Scheme P.
Current Situation
Scheme P: Acidic power station emissions and effects on plant life
Think about how much the implementation of Scheme P is worth to you.
What is the maximum amount you would be prepared to pay per year in order to implement Scheme P such that the air quality is improved from its current level to the level described in Scheme P.
(WRITE YOUR ANSWER IN THE BOXES BELOW)
55 After this point scheme P NO LONGER OPERATES Consider now a move from the Current Situation to that under Scheme A. Note that scheme A is simply Scheme H and Scheme P.
Current Situation
Think about how much the implementation of Scheme H is worth to you.
(WRITE YOUR ANSWER IN THE BOXES BELOW) Maximum amount per year: (£) (p)
56
The next 15 questions deal with your feelings about a range of issues. There are no right or wrong answers. Please write at the end of each line which number on the scale given below indicates how much you agree or disagree with it. Please try to answer every statement even if you don't have a strong opinion about it. I would like your immediate response, so please do not spend too much time on any one question. This research concerns peoples views about air pollution. We deliberately do not provide you with lots of new information and statistics about the current level or impacts of air pollution as we want to avoid unduly influencing your answers with information that most people do not have.
Statement
We are going to tell you about two alternative air quality improvement schemes. Once we have told you about both schemes, then we will consider each in turn and ask you what the maximum amount you would be willing to pay per year for each scheme to be implemented in practice. We are not going to go into technical details about how schemes will be implemented or about how money would be collected as there are a variety of possible options and this is not what we are interested in. Do not worry about these technical details, just think about how much you are willing to pay for each scheme.
As each of the two schemes is an alternative to the current situation we start by briefly considering, in very simple terms, what this current situation is.
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Current Situation
There are two alternative air quality improvement schemes: First, we could implement the following scheme:
Scheme H: Toxic vehicle emissions and human health
Secondly we could implement the following alternative.
We are now going to consider each of the alternative improvement schemes in turn, and how much the implementation of each of these schemes is worth to you. We shall start with Scheme H and then move on to Scheme A. In each case, think about how much you would value a move from the Current Situation to that provided by each scheme.
First consider a move from the Current Situation to that under Scheme H. Here again is the Current Situation:
Scheme H: Toxic vehicle emissions and human health
Think about how much the implementation of Scheme H is worth to you. Feel free to compare the schemes before answering.
(WRITE YOUR ANSWER IN THE BOXES BELOW) maximum amount per year: (£) (p)
Consider now a move from the Current Situation to that under Scheme A.
Current Situation
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• The main effect of the acidic emissions produced by power stations is upon plant life.
For example power plant emissions are associated with acid rain which damages plants.
Think about how much the implementation of Scheme A is worth to you. Feel free to compare the schemes before answering.
(WRITE YOUR ANSWER IN THE BOXES BELOW)
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Statement
We are going to tell you about three alternative air quality improvement schemes. Once we have told you about all three then we will consider each in turn and ask you what the maximum amount you would be willing to pay per year for each scheme to be implemented in practice. We are not going to go into technical details about how schemes will be implemented or about how money would be collected as there are a variety of possible options and this is not what we are interested in. Do not worry about these technical details, just think about how much you are willing to pay for each scheme.
As each of the three schemes is an alternative to the current situation we start by briefly considering, in very simple terms, what this current situation is.
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Current Situation
There are three alternative air quality improvement schemes: First, we could implement the following scheme:
The second alternative is as follows:
Finally we could implement the following alternative which is simply a combination of both of the above alternatives.
We are now going to consider each of the alternative improvement schemes in turn, and how much the implementation of each of these schemes is worth to you. We shall start with Scheme H, then move on to Scheme P, and finally consider Scheme A. In each case, think about how much you would value a move from the Current Situation to that provided by each scheme.
Scheme H: Toxic vehicle emissions and human health
(WRITE YOUR ANSWER IN THE BOXES BELOW)
67 Consider now a move from the Current Situation to that under Scheme P.
Current Situation
Scheme P: Acidic power station emissions and effects on plant life
Think about how much the implementation of Scheme P is worth to you. Feel free to compare the schemes before answering.
(WRITE YOUR ANSWER IN THE BOXES BELOW)
maximum amount per year:
68 Consider now a move from the Current Situation to that under Scheme A.
Current Situation
(WRITE YOUR ANSWER IN THE BOXES BELOW)
Consider a move from the Current Situation to that under Scheme P.
Current Situation
Scheme P: Acidic power station emissions and effects on plant life
(WRITE YOUR ANSWER IN THE BOXES BELOW)
After this point scheme P NO LONGER OPERATES Please consider now a move from the Current Situation described below to that under Scheme H.
Current Situation
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Scheme H: Toxic vehicle emissions and human health
(WRITE YOUR ANSWER IN THE BOXES BELOW)
The next 15 questions deal with your feelings about a range of issues. There are no right or wrong answers. Please write at the end of each line which number on the scale given below indicates how much you agree or disagree with it. Please try to answer every statement even if you don't have a strong opinion about it. I would like your immediate response, so please do not spend too much time on any one question. 
Statement

Appendix C: Further analytic details
In this Appendix we present further details regarding the various analyses presented in the main body of this paper. These are as follows: Table C .7 provides further distributional data for the analysis given in Table 8 of the main text of the paper. (1) Dependent variable = WTP for good A (either stated or calculated) (2) All tests all 2 tailed (3) dataset excluding 7 non-respondents (total of 256 interviewed) (4) excludes 3 observations of £1000, £900 and £900
(5) excludes 5 observations of £1000, £900, £900, £500 and £500.
(6) Monte Carlo Kruskal-Wallis test based on 10,000 iterations. Therefore the sum of 1st responses for H and P (where respondents are unaware of other goods, i.e. SHA H or SHPA H for good H and SPH P for good P) yields a calculated value for A (denoted CALC1 for SHA H + SPH P and CALC2 for SHPA H + SPH P ) which exceeds that obtained from stated estimates of WTP A (SHA A , SHPA A , AHA A , AHPA A ). This implies that single good (part) valuations, added together, will overestimate the value of combined good (whole) values.
